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The Role Of Advanced Cost Recovery In
Nuclear Energy Policy
by Robert C. Volpe*

T

Introduction: Nuclear Power and
Advanced Cost Recovery

he United States, its electricity providers, policy makers, and environmental advocates, all have a goal of
achieving cleaner and more efficient energy. President
Barack Obama endorsed this goal,1 Congress enacted legislation towards this goal,2 and states have created various programs
to achieve cleaner and more cost-effective energy.3 Nuclear
power offers the means to achieve that goal, but nuclear power
has a maligned reputation. High-profile disasters and extreme
construction cost overruns put the U.S. nuclear power industry
behind other sources of
electricity in terms of
consideration and new
development. However,
perception is changing and nuclear power
is beginning to be rerecognized as the energy
source of the future.4
L aw m a k e r s a r e
encouraging new nuclear
development. At the federal level, tax credits and
loan guarantees provide
incentives for nuclear
power.5 At the state level, Advanced Cost Recovery (“ACR”)6
programs have become increasingly popular.7 ACR programs
allow utility providers to recover the costs associated with the
development and construction of nuclear facilities prior to
the facility going into service. This ultimately lowers the cost
to ratepayers by reducing carrying charges.8 By reducing the
financial risk to utility providers, ACR statutes have helped
encourage development of the first new nuclear facilities in
the United States in nearly thirty years. 9 Current projects
are limited to a few southeastern states.10 Georgia, Florida,
and South Carolina lead the way in ACR legislation and new
nuclear development.
Where ACR has been implemented, it has been challenged.
Some consider ACR to be solely for the benefit of utility companies, at the expense of the ratepayers.11 In Southern Alliance for
Clean Energy v. Graham12 (“SACE v. Graham”), SACE argued
that ACR as implemented in Florida was an unconstitutional
delegation of authority and the associated costs were arbitrary.
These arguments have been rejected, but that does not make ACR
policies infallible. State legislators and regulators using ACR to

encourage new nuclear projects must create and manage ACR
programs in a way that provides the largest benefit and the lowest
cost to the public. To do so requires diligence, and adjustment if
necessary. Without close attention to effective ACR policy, the
hoped-for expansion of nuclear power could be short-lived.
Other articles have addressed nuclear cost recovery, but this
is the first one to analyze the decision in SACE v. Graham and its
effect on nuclear regulatory policy. This is also the first article to
propose a change in utility ratemaking policy that could further
the goals of ACR laws. The proposed change creates incentives
for nuclear projects through an increased allowable rate of return
on ACR costs, while
protecting ratepayers
through more stringent
cost review.
Section I of this
article discusses the
importance of nuclear
electricity generation in
meeting energy needs
and environmental goals.
Section II provides a history of nuclear energy in
the United States from
its inception as an energy
source through recent
federal and state legislation. Additionally, Section II analyzes
three ACR programs, in Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina.
Section III analyzes SACE v. Graham, a recent decision on
ACR by the Florida Supreme Court, and the effect of that case
on nuclear energy policies in Florida. Section III also analyzes
changes to the Florida cost recovery law and discusses potential shortcomings. Section IV suggests changes to ratemaking
policy that will promote nuclear energy development around
the United States.
In focusing on ACR and recent challenges to it, this article
analyzes a specific area of energy policy and makes concrete suggestions for improvement. It also strives to show that while ACR
has withstood legal challenges, this is not enough. Policies must
adjust and improve. The suggestions made in the final section
will not shake the foundations of electricity regulation; however,

“Modern life requires
constant and reliable
electricity, and in the United
States, the demand for
electricity is more than any
other country.”
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the recovery structure suggested may offer a small improvement
to current policies. At their best, small improvements can create
large outcomes. Advanced cost recovery has shown its value.
This article aims to make it more valuable.

The Importance of Nuclear Energy
Modern life requires constant and reliable electricity, and
in the United States, the demand for electricity is more than
any other country.13 Although analysts project that the U.S. will
become more energy efficient in the future, overall electrical
consumption is still projected to increase.14 A net increase in
electrical consumption must be met with a real increase in electricity production. Utilities and regulators consider many factors
in determining which sources of electrical generation to pursue;
among the most important are cost, power availability, and
environmental interests. This section discusses the importance
of nuclear power as a component of the energy policy needed to
meet growing demand and highlights the comparative benefits
offered by this source.

Economic Benefits:
Cost and Reliability

“Although nuclear energy
generation is relatively costly
up front due to its capital
costs, nuclear plants can
be efficient over the long
term, since the fuel is very
inexpensive compared with
fossil-fuel sources.”

Total electricity
consumption in the
U.S. increased 33.6%
between 1990 and
2013. 15 Consumption
decreased by 2.37% over
the past six years since
the peak of electricity use
in 2007.16 This decline
could be attributable to
the 2007 recession, which
followed an economic
boom. Even with the
recent decrease, overall
demand for electricity in
the U.S. is predicted to increase 25% from 2012 to 2040.17 The
current economic recovery signals that energy consumption will
increase in the future. To meet the increase in demand, utility
companies have several options: fossil fuels, including natural
gas, coal, and oil; renewables, such as wind, solar, and biofuels;
and nuclear reactors. The cost and reliability of each source varies greatly.
The cost of electricity generation concerns utility providers,
ratepayers, and government officials. However, sustaining energy
affordability while trying to achieve the environmental goals of
lower greenhouse gas emissions and carbon dioxide levels presents enormous challenges. The U.S. Energy Information Agency
estimates that among new sources of electricity generation coming online by 2019, new nuclear plants would be among the least
expensive on a levelized basis.18 The estimated levelized cost of
electricity is $96.1/MWh for nuclear, a range of $95.6/MWh to
$147.4/MWh for coal, and $64.4/MWh to $128.4/MWh for natural gas.19 The estimated levelized cost for wind power is $80.3/
MWh, but the report notes that because of the low capacity
Winter 2015

factor of wind electricity generation, one should be cautioned
when comparing wind power to a more reliable source.20
A variety of renewable sources of energy are available.
Among the most popular are wind energy, solar energy, and
biomass or biomass ethanol. Other sources include geothermal
energy and wave and tidal energy. These sources are becoming increasingly inexpensive and more efficient, but reliability
continues to be an issue. Reliability distinguishes fossil fuels
and nuclear reactors from renewable resources. The reliability
and efficiency of an electricity source is measured by a source’s
capacity factor, which is the actual power output of a plant
compared to the rated nameplate capacity, represented on a
percentage basis.21 For wind turbines, the reported capacity
factor ranged between 28.1% and 32.3% from January 2009 to
January 2013.22 In 2013, wind turbines operated at the highest
capacity over the five-year period.23 This suggests efficiency
of wind turbines is increasing, albeit slowly. But there is a
maximum achievable capacity. Wind is not constant; accordingly, wind power cannot be constant. Similar
to wind power, solar
photovoltaic facilities
operated at a capacity
factor of 19.4%.24 Solar
plants can only generate
power during daylight
hours, and then only in
favorable conditions. In
stark contrast, nuclear
facilities generate the
most consistent and
reliable electricity of
any currently available
source. In the U.S., the
104 operating nuclear
reactors have operated at
an average capacity fac25
tor of 89.6% over the past ten years. Nuclear plants operate
twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a year, with only incremental
interruptions for refueling. This is base-load electricity.26 On
a constantly fluctuating electrical grid, nuclear and fossil fuels
offer reliability. The most popular renewable resources, wind
and solar, do not. The unreliability of renewable energy sources
require fossil-fuel-powered facilities — typically natural gas —
to fill the gap when renewable sources cannot generate an
adequate amount of energy to meet demand.27
Cost — mainly capital development costs and variable operational costs — also distinguishes nuclear reactors from other
forms of electricity generation. Capital costs (construction and
financing) account for 71.4% of overall nuclear generation costs,
while capital costs are only 60.0% and 14.3% of conventional
coal and natural gas generation costs, respectively.28 Interest
accrues on any capital, either debt or equity, obtained for construction of a facility. The higher construction cost and longer
construction periods for nuclear facilities create higher interest
29

and financing costs. This is where utility providers and ratepayers can benefit from ACR. By allowing the utility to recover
costs during the initial phases of development, financing charges
are effectively lowered and capital costs decreased.29
In the initial era of nuclear development (1960s through the
early 1980s), cost overruns plagued the industry. Actual construction costs for plants built during this period averaged 200
percent over projected cost.30 Given this history, ratepayers and
policy makers are concerned with potential cost overruns with
the new generation of nuclear facilities. But over-budget construction has not universally been the case. Construction of the
V.C. Summer reactors in South Carolina is reported to be under
budget.31 It may be the case that with modern reactor designs
extreme cost and timetable overruns are no longer a part of the
construction of nuclear energy.32
Although nuclear energy generation is relatively costly
up front due to its capital costs, nuclear plants can be efficient
over the long term, since the fuel is very inexpensive compared
with fossil-fuel sources. Variable costs (mainly fuel costs) are
11.8% of the total levelized nuclear costs, 30.3% of overall conventional coal costs, and 49.1% of overall natural gas costs.33
This makes natural gas
electricity more susceptible to market fluctuations in fuel prices.
Recent discoveries and
new technologies such
as hydraulic fracturing
have drastically reduced
the price of natural gas to
its lowest real price since
1999.34 In the immediate
future, this will likely
keep natural gas electricity costs low, but as a long-term investment, nuclear energy is a
strong competitor on price and stability due to its low comparative fuel costs.
Incentives like tax credits and ACR were not included in
the calculations of nuclear energy’s levelized costs.35 These programs drastically lower costs associated with the development
of new generation sources. The numbers discussed above swing
even further in favor of nuclear energy generation when taking
incentives into account.

inexpensive fuels, the real cost is in the pollution through GHG
emissions. The U.S. burned 925 million tons of coal and 26 billion cubic feet of natural gas in 2013.38 Emissions from burning
coal and natural gas include sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, and
carbon oxides, all of which contribute to air pollution problems.39
Increasing the use of nuclear power over fossil fuels can reverse
that trend. In fact, generation from existing nuclear energy facilities avoided 590 million metric tons of carbon dioxide across the
U.S. in 2013.40 Because nuclear power plants do not emit GHGs,
every megawatt of new nuclear will directly reduce air pollution.
This factor is even more relevant considering the
Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) recent Clean Power
Plan, a proposed rule to cut carbon emissions from existing
power plants.41 Many existing coal-fired power plants do not
meet the EPA’s proposed criteria. In some states, the proposed
regulations would reduce the use of coal power by up to 90%.42
To meet the proposed regulations, many states are considering
more natural gas facilities. Replacing coal plants with natural
gas while natural gas prices are at historic lows is a cost effective
option. But complete reliance on one fuel source would leave
utilities and their ratepayers vulnerable to fluctuations in fuel
prices. Nuclear power
facilities would meet the
EPA’s lower carbon emissions requirements and
protect against the risk of
fuel price fluctuations.
In addition to air
quality considerations,
generating electricity has
substantial land-based
impacts, which vary
by generation source.
Energy sprawl, a term
coined by The Nature Conservancy, denotes the vast amount
of land needed to produce certain types of energy.43 Renewable
energy resources such as wind, solar, and biofuel cause significant energy sprawl. Energy sprawl is measurable in terms of land
use intensity, calculating how much land is required to generate
an amount of electricity, measured in square kilometers per terawatt hour per year (km2/TWh/yr).44 The Nature Conservancy
determined solar photovoltaic power generation requires 36.9
km2/TWh/yr, wind generation 72.1, and biomass generation a
staggering 543.4.45 In comparison, nuclear power generation has
a land use intensity of 2.4 km2/TWh/yr, the lowest of any power
source. Like GHG emissions, nuclear power can reduce energy
sprawl caused by land intensive types of energy.
Nuclear energy is the only reliable source of zero-emission, always-on, base-load electricity. No other source, whether
renewable or fossil fuel, can provide reliable electricity with
zero GHG emissions. Fossil fuels provide cheap base-load
energy, but with a tradeoff in GHG emissions. Renewable
sources, such as wind and solar, have no GHG emissions, but
are not reliable or powerful enough to meet demand, and cause
excessive energy sprawl.

“The primary benefit of
nuclear energy over fossil
fuels is that nuclear power
plants do not emit any
greenhouse gases (“GHGs”).”

Environmental Benefits: Greenhouse Gas Emissions
and Energy Sprawl
In addition to offering long-term reliability and cost savings,
nuclear energy provides important environmental benefits. In
electrical power generation two central factors of environmental significance are greenhouse gas emissions and use of land
resources through mining, drilling, or energy sprawl.36 Nuclear
energy is relatively strong on both fronts.
The primary benefit of nuclear energy over fossil fuels is
that nuclear power plants do not emit any greenhouse gases
(“GHGs”).37 Although coal and natural gas are seemingly
30
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Fossil fuels currently account for a significant percentage of
electricity generation. With improvements in hydraulic fracturing technology and the expansion of shale gas developments in
the domestic oil and gas industry, the dominance of fossil fuels
is not likely to change in the near future.46 However, the shale
oil and natural gas boom will not last forever and in order to
satisfy the nation’s energy needs and assuage its environmental
concerns over the long term, nuclear energy will need to play a
more significant role.47

Nuclear Energy in the United States:
History and Recent Developments
Nuclear energy is an important piece of a complex set of
local, state, and federal programs, incentives, and laws that,
together, form the U.S. energy policy. Historically, nuclear
energy has experienced varying levels of public and governmental support. This section explores the history of nuclear policy
and development in the U.S. and recent governmental support
for nuclear energy.
On the heels of World War II and the Manhattan Project, the
U.S. realized the potential for using nuclear power to generate
electricity. To stay ahead of the rest of the world, Congress passed
the Atomic Energy Act
of 1946. 48 Under this
law, the national nuclear
program was under the
control of the military
and did not permit
private involvement. 49
Less than ten years later,
the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954 allowed for
private investment in
the development of commercial nuclear energy.50 Policy makers proclaimed that, “electricity generated by nuclear power
would be ‘too cheap to meter.’”51 However, exposure to liability
associated with nuclear energy was an initial barrier to private
development.52 To alleviate these risks, Congress passed the
Price-Anderson Act of 1957, which gave utility providers limited
liability for a catastrophic accident.53 As a result of the Atomic
Energy Act and the Price-Anderson Act, development of nuclear
power plants boomed through the mid-1970s.54
The so-called “Great Band Wagon Market” ended in 1978,
and for a period of thirty years, no new combined licenses
(“COLs”) were approved.55 This dark period for nuclear development resulted from a combination of the partial meltdown
at the Three Mile Island plant in Pennsylvania, the Arab oil
embargo,56 and increased interest rates in the late 1970s that led
to large cost overruns in construction.57 The 1980s saw massive
inflation in the cost of construction materials and labor along
with double-digit financing rates, exaggerating cost overruns in
coal and nuclear plants that were under construction.58 Safety
was also a question after the Three Mile Island incident. The
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“NRC”) responded to safety
concerns by extending the scope and breadth of its regulation

and oversight, which fundamentally changed the way the nuclear
industry operates.59
The timing of the Three Mile Island incident could not have
been more detrimental to the nuclear power industry. Excessive
cost overruns in construction of new nuclear facilities and
decreasing costs of other energy resources such as oil, natural
gas, and renewables compounded the devastating effects of the
Three Mile Island event.60

The “Nuclear Renaissance” and National Nuclear
Energy Policy
A resurgence of interest in nuclear power has followed this
dark period in nuclear policy, starting with congressional passage of the Energy Policy Act in 2005.61 This act provided significant tax credit incentives for nuclear generation facilities as
well as federal loan guarantees and risk insurance assistance.62
As a result, sixteen applications to the NRC were filed between
2005 and 2008. The resurgence has earned the nickname
“Nuclear Renaissance.”63
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 included a provision offering utilities production tax credits to encourage development
of certain electricity sources, including nuclear.64 The addition
to the Internal Revenue
Code titled “The Credit
for Production from
Advanced Nuclear Power
Facilities” allows utilities
to be eligible for a tax
credit of up to 1.8 cents
per kWh for the development of new nuclear
energy plants.65 The tax
credit provision includes
several limitations. To be eligible for this credit, a facility must
be placed into operation prior to January 1, 2021.66 The IRS set
additional application and construction limits not included in
the statute: a facility had to obtain its construction and operating
license by December 31, 2008, and had to begin construction by
January 1, 2014.67
Aside from the timeline limitations, the statute limits the tax
credits as follows: credits are only available for the first eight
years of production at each facility;68 the tax is distributed based
on a ratio of the facility’s nameplate capacity to the aggregate
national limitation of 6,000 megawatts;69 annually, the per facility credit is limited to $125 million per 1,000 MWe capacity;70
and the credit phases out each year.71
While the tax credit spurred immediate interest in new
nuclear construction, the law’s time limitations have barred any
additional utilities from taking advantage of the program. A total
of five new reactors at three locations met the application and
construction time limitations to qualify for the credits.72 Even
for those facilities, delays in construction could cause failure to
meet the strict timeline requirement to be operational by January
1, 2021, and thus not be eligible for the tax credit. This presents a risk to investors relying on the tax credit in their financial

“In the wake of the
Fukushima disaster, Japan
completely shut down all
reactors in the country.”
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calculations.73 The other limitations discussed above present risk
and uncertainty to investors and utilities.
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 provided a loan guarantee
program through the Department of Energy (“DOE”).74 This
program provides federal government backing to loans for
advanced nuclear generation facilities. Titled “Incentives for
Innovative Technologies,” the program requires that guarantees
be given to “employ new or significantly improved technologies
as compared to commercial technologies in service in the U.S. at
the time the guarantee is issued.”75 The secretary of the DOE has
broad discretion in the approval of guarantees and reasonable
interest rates.76 If a borrower defaults on loan obligations, the
DOE will pay the obligations. In return, the DOE subrogates the
rights to any property acquired pursuant to the guarantee.77 The
U.S. attorney general will attempt to recover for unpaid debts.78
These loan guarantees provide stability and reduce risk to
utilities, investors, and lenders. By reducing the risk to lenders,
the borrower (the utility)
pays lower interest rates,
ultimately lowering utility prices to ratepayers.
This is evidenced by the
two projects currently
utilizing loan guarantees.
Recently, the DOE issued
$6.5 billion in loan guarantees to Georgia Power
with an additional $1.8
billion as a conditional
commitment.79
Another element
of federal encouragement for nuclear energy
involves liability caps
and insurance guarantees. Nuclear energy has
proved to be very safe.
There have only been
three major nuclear reactor incidents worldwide in the sixty-year
history of nuclear power.80 Compared with other generating
sources, the chance of a catastrophic event from nuclear energy
is minuscule.81 The worst nuclear incident in the U.S., Three
Mile Island, did not cause a single death. In fact, there has not
been a single death related to radiation in the entire history of
U.S. nuclear power.82
However, as seen in previous disasters such as Chernobyl
and Fukushima, when something goes wrong, the results can be
devastating. For this reason, Congress indemnified nuclear facilities through the Price-Anderson Act.83 Each licensed facility is
required to carry a minimum amount of insurance and contribute
to a pooled insurance fund.84 If a disaster were to occur, the utility is strictly liable for damages, to be paid by insurance and the
Price-Anderson fund. The federal government pays any excess
liability. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 extends the protection
of the Price-Anderson Act through 2025.85 This federal backing

offers security to utilities that would otherwise not be able to
obtain insurance or risk the occurrence of a major event.

Recent Setbacks and Advances in New
Nuclear Power
Two major events in the past five years have dramatically
affected nuclear energy development: (1) a tsunami in 2011
caused major damage and radiation containment problems at
the Fukushima nuclear plant in Japan; (2) litigation and political controversy surrounding the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste
repository have halted progress in creating a national high-level
nuclear waste storage facility for the foreseeable future.
In 2011, an earthquake off the eastern cost of Japan caused
a massive tsunami that swept into the Tōhoku region of Japan.
This tragic event caused thousands of deaths and billions of
dollars in damage. The tsunami flooded the Fukushima Nuclear
Power Plant causing power failures to the main and back-up
systems. In the wake of
the Fukushima disaster,
Japan completely shut
down all reactors in the
country. Other countries
scaled backed or cancelled their nuclear power
programs.86 On the other
hand, the nuclear regulators of the world have
responded to this event
with increased safety programs and cooperation.87
The United States NRC
drastically enhanced
and reconsidered safety
standards for U.S.
nuclear facilities after
the Fukushima disaster.88
The damage from the
Fukushima disaster will
be long lasting, but the nuclear industry may be stronger for it
in the end.89
High-level nuclear waste, which refers to the spent fuel rods
from the generation of nuclear power, is currently stored onsite
at power plants around the country. The Nuclear Waste Policy
Act of 1982 (“NWPA”) intended to create a national waste
repository for permanent storage.90 The DOE was charged with
selecting a site and building a repository for spent nuclear fuel.91
The law designates that the DOE consider the Yucca Mountain in
Nevada as the location.92 But due to delays, political battles, and
litigation, the repository has not been created. The DOE submitted an application to the NRC for construction of the repository
at Yucca Mountain, but it has yet to be reviewed or approved.
In the most recent litigation, the D.C. Court of Appeals ordered
the NRC to follow its statutory mandate and review the petition
for Yucca Mountain.93 Currently, there has yet to be a facility prepared to accept high-level waste, and it continues to be

“Currently, there has yet to
be a facility prepared to
accept high-level waste,
and it continues to be stored
on-site at power plants.
Until this issue is resolved,
spent fuel storage will continue
to be a cloud of uncertainty
over the nuclear industry.”
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stored on-site at power plants. Until this issue is resolved, spent
fuel storage will continue to be a cloud of uncertainty over the
nuclear industry.94
Although struggles to identify an acceptable repository for
nuclear waste continue, nuclear reactor technology is becoming
ever more efficient and safe. The Westinghouse AP1000 reactors
being constructed at Vogtle and V.C. Summer are significantly
improved from older generation reactors.95 Even more significant are the next generation of reactors. Currently the NRC is
reviewing five different designs for Generation IV reactors and
Small Modular Reactors.96 Those reactors are smaller, cheaper,
more efficient, and create less waste. “Small reactors can’t
address all the problems standing in the way of more nuclear
investment, but they can address the biggest barriers — the
economic ones.”97 The proposed designs minimize high-level
nuclear waste through recycling and more efficient use.98 Some
designs even burn the nuclear waste that is sitting dormant at
facilities across the U.S.99 Despite the hurdles for the nuclear
industry, technological advances are pushing the industry into
the future.
To complement this section’s discussion of federal policy
encouraging the development of nuclear power and recent events
that have had an effect on a national level, the following section
addresses state policy. Nuclear power regulation operates as a
joint federalism scheme. At the federal level, reactor designs and
facility plans are approved, while state lawmakers and regulators mandate how utilities operate. The following section looks
at states that are successfully developing nuclear power and the
regulations that make such development possible.

Development of Nuclear Facilities and
Advanced Cost Recovery Policy in
Southern States
In addition to the federal tax incentives and loan guarantees
discussed above, several states recently passed statutes to encourage new nuclear development.100 Since 2005, at least twenty-two
states have enacted some form of legislation or regulation that
supports nuclear electricity generation.101 ACR (also referred to
as construction work in progress or CWIP) is among the most
popular.102 Some scholars believe that ACR is essential for new
nuclear power plants to be economically feasible,103 although
other scholars believe there are alternative financing mechanisms to achieve the same goals as ACR.104 Notable states on the
forefront of ACR or CWIP include South Carolina, where South
Carolina Electric and Gas Company has received a COL for two
new reactors from the NRC;105 Georgia, where two new reactors
are under construction at the Georgia Power’s Vogtle Electric
Generating Plant;106 and Florida, where Florida Power and Light
(“FPL”) is under review for the approval and pre-construction
phase for two new nuclear reactors.107
Prior to allowing CWIP in the rate base, the traditional
approach was to account for construction costs and recover
those costs in the base rate once the facility was in service.
This is called allowance for funds used during construction
(“AFUDC”).108 Allowing utilities to recover construction and
Winter 2015

pre-construction costs while in that phase of development rather
than carrying those costs over the entire process lowers the total
costs to ratepayers and the perceived risk of investment in the
project.109 Lowering the risk and total cost to increase investment is at the core of ACR.
The majority of new applications for nuclear reactors in
the country are in southeastern states.110 This section focuses
on three of them: Georgia, South Carolina, and Florida. For
an analysis of state regulatory structures that affect the development of nuclear electricity generation, these three states
are ideal. Facilities are currently under construction in both
Georgia and South Carolina –– the first new nuclear plants
in the U.S. in nearly thirty years. Furthermore, litigation over
Florida’s highly controversial ACR program offers ample
opportunity to analyze challenges to such legislation. This section discusses each state’s current nuclear electricity projects
and respective ACR or CWIP laws.

Georgia
Georgia leads the charge in the development of new nuclear
facilities in the U.S. Georgia Power’s Vogtle Units 3 and 4, two
Westinghouse AP1000 reactors, are currently under construction.111 Barring a major delay, the new facilities will be operational by the end of 2018.112 These reactors will generate 1,100
MWe each, and are the first new reactors in the U.S. in nearly
thirty years.113 Georgia’s pro-nuclear cost recovery laws are
among the many financing tools the utility took advantage of for
this project.
In 2009, the Georgia legislature passed the Georgia Nuclear
Energy Financing Act, which was intended “to provide for a
utility to recover from its customers the costs of financing associated with the construction of a nuclear generating plant.”114
It does just that, and with a straightforward approach to cost
recovery — the utility will recover “costs of financing associated with the construction of a nuclear generating plant” so
long as the costs are approved by the Georgia Public Service
Commission (“GPSC”).115 Financing changes are recoverable
through CWIP, and are based on the actual costs of debt and the
authorized cost of equity.116 All costs are to be recovered from
each customer on an equal percentage basis. 117
The Georgia law gives the GPSC the power to authorize
accounting treatment for the recovered costs.118 This provision is
unique to the Georgia CWIP law. It has been suggested that this
language allows the GPSC to consider the utilities entire balance
sheet and gives the GPSC the power to require profits from projects other than the nuclear facility to offset costs of the current
project before the utility is reimbursed for costs.119
Georgia’s CWIP provision excludes a requirement for costs
to be “prudent” as found in the Florida and South Carolina laws.
The original bill included this language, but it was removed by
the first floor amendment.120 This language may not carry any
significant weight in application. As seen in the case study below,
public service commissions of all three states are lenient in
determining costs that may be recovered through CWIP. Without
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a floor determination of what is not a prudent cost, it is difficult
to know whether the prudence review has any real meaning.
Georgia allows costs for cancelled projects, but not within the
CWIP statute. The law allows a utility to recover actual investment
costs, along with carrying costs of a cancelled project.121

South Carolina
South Carolina is moving forward with nuclear power development of its own. South Carolina Electric & Gas Company
obtained a COL from the NRC in 2012 for two reactors at the
V.C. Summer Nuclear Station.122 The NRC issued the COL for
the V.C. Summer reactors one month after issuing the permit for
the Vogtle project in Georgia.123 Construction on V.C. Summer
Units 2 and 3 began in March of 2013.124
The Base Load Review Act, passed in 2007, encourages
new nuclear development.125 It unambiguously states that the
purpose of the law “is to provide for the recovery of the prudently incurred costs associated with new base load plants . . .
while at the same time protecting customers of investor-owned
electrical utilities from responsibility for imprudent financial
obligations or costs.”126
The Base Load Recovery Act includes a prudency review
of pre-construction costs.127 Additionally, the law includes a
provision for review of costs in the event that the utility decides
to abandon the project after a prudency review.128 In the event
of an abandoned project, the utility may be able to recover for
pre-construction costs through AFUDC included in the base
rate. However, the utility has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the decision was prudent.129 The
“recovery of capital costs and the utility’s cost of capital associated with them may be disallowed only to the extent that the failure by the utility to anticipate or avoid the allegedly imprudent
costs, or to minimize the magnitude of the costs, was imprudent
considering the information available at the time that the utility could have acted to avoid or minimize the costs.”130 This
provision greatly increases the risk to a utility for abandoning a
project. It may also incentivize a utility to consider the prudency
of costs prior to incurring them. This is slightly different from
the Georgia cancellation provision that does not affirmatively set
a preponderance of the evidence standard for demonstrating that
costs were prudently incurred.

Florida
Florida has four operating nuclear reactors. Two are located
at the St. Lucie facility in St. Lucie County, and two are located
at the Turkey Point facility in Miami Dade County. Both facilities are owned by FPL.131 A fifth reactor in Crystal River, owned
by Duke Energy Florida (“DEF”), temporarily ceased operation
in 2009 for repairs. Due to damage to the containment structure
during repairs, DEF announced the plant will not reopen.132
Between 2009 and 2011, nuclear power accounted for an average of 11.24% of the total electrical generation in Florida.133
Applications for four new nuclear generating facilities in
Florida have been submitted to the NRC during the past five
years. FPL applied for a COL from the NRC for two new reactors at its Turkey Point facility in 2009, Turkey Point Units 6
34

and 7.134 The license application is currently under review.135
Progress Energy (now DEF) also applied for a COL from the
NRC in 2008 to build two reactors in Levy County.136 Although
there have been delays in the licensing process, and construction
plans have been cancelled, DEF continues to seek the COL for
the Levy facility.137

Advanced Cost Recovery in Florida: Original
2006 Legislation
Following passage of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Florida,
along with several other states previously discussed, enacted
legislation to incentivize the development of nuclear electricity generation. Section 366.93 of the Florida Statute provides
for recovery of costs prudently incurred in the siting, design,
licensing, and construction of new nuclear power plants.138
The goal of the cost recovery statute is to “promote utility
investment in nuclear . . . power plants.”139 The Florida Public
Service Commission was charged with establishing rules and
mechanisms to achieve this goal.140 The rule established under
this authority is Rule 25-6.0423, Florida Administrative Code,
known as the Capacity Cost Recovery Clause (“CCRC”).141
Requirements for the CCRC include annual review for the
“reasonableness” of projected pre-construction costs and “prudence” of actual pre-construction expenditures.142 To provide
incentives for investment and certainty, carrying costs were to
equal the utility’s AFUDC.143 Once in service, ongoing costs
are recovered through the increases to the base rate.144 In the
event that the facility was not completed, the statute allowed
for the recovery of costs incurred in the pre-construction and
construction phases.145 The legislation was updated in 2008 to
include “uprate” projects that increase the generating capacity
of existing nuclear plants and expanded or relocated electrical
transmission lines.146
Since its inception in 2006, § 366.93 Fla. Stat. has been
subjected to several legal challenges. Cost recovery statutes in
Georgia and South Carolina have also been challenged, but the
courts have upheld the laws in each case.147 The following section of this article analyzes one challenge in Florida, Southern
Alliance for Clean Energy v. Graham, and the subsequent
amendments to the Florida ACR law and administrative rules
triggered by the case.

Advanced Nuclear Cost Recovery Case Study:
Southern Alliance for Clean Energy v. Graham
(and Subsequent Legislative Amendments)
In many areas of the law, it is only through litigation and
judicial interpretation that the effects of legislation are seen. And
on occasion, legislation will be modified based on the interpretation of the courts. This is no different with electricity regulation. Florida Statutes § 366.93 was litigated and subsequently
amended. The following section analyzes the pertinent case and
its effect on current cost recovery legislation in Florida.

Southern Alliance for Clean Energy v. Graham
In 2008 the Florida Public Service Commission (“FPSC”)
granted approval to FPL and DEF for cost recovery for the site
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selection and pre-construction cost of nuclear power facilities
at Turkey Point and Levy.148 The FPSC authorized recovery
amounts for FPL and DEF of $196,088,824 and $85,951,036,
respectively.149 These amounts included pre-construction costs
for the proposed nuclear generation facilities as well as “uprate”
projects at existing facilities. Southern Alliance for Clean Energy
(“SACE”), an advocacy group that had been at the forefront of
the anti-nuclear campaign, opposed the pre-construction cost
recovery allotments, but did not oppose the “uprate” projects.150
In their complaint, SACE argued that the order was arbitrary and
unsupported by substantial evidence, and that § 366.93 is unconstitutional as a violation of the separation of powers.151 The
Florida Supreme Court rejected SACE’s arguments and upheld
the FPSC’s decision.152

Separation of Powers Argument
SACE argued that the statute was unconstitutionally broad
in its delegation of power to the FPSC — more specifically, that
the FPSC’s ability to create a rule and mechanism for deciding
cost recovery imparted a legislative power. The basis for this
argument was that § 366.93 did not set any standards for the
FPSC to implement the goal of promoting investment in nuclear
electricity generation, and that the language for establishing
a mechanism — “include, but not be limited to” — was too
broad.153 SACE added that the “prudently incurred costs” language in the statute did not give guidance to or put restrictions
on the FPSC.154 The court, however, reasoned that it was proper
to give the FPSC rulemaking authority, and that other language
in the statute gave proper guidance to the FPSC in creating and
enforcing rules.155 The court found that “prudently incurred
costs” were defined by a standard of “what a reasonable utility
manager would have done, in light of the conditions and circumstances that were known, or should have been known at the time
the decision was made.”156

“Intent to Build” Argument
The second argument proffered by SACE claimed that
neither FPL nor DEF demonstrated an “intent to build” as
required by § 366.93. Rather, the pre-construction activities only
established an “option to build” the nuclear facilities.157 SACE
claimed that the statute required a utility to engage in plant siting, design, licensing, and construction simultaneously to show
“intent to build.”158 The FPSC had a different interpretation of
the statute: that the siting, design, licensing, and construction
phases were not required to occur simultaneously, and in fact
could not occur simultaneously.159
The FPSC’s interpretation of the statute led the court to conclude that “preconstruction activities creating an option to build
can demonstrate a utility company’s intent to build, and thus its
eligibility to recover associated costs under the statute.”160 SACE
argued that this interpretation was arbitrary and unsupported
by competent substantial evidence,161 and that the “option to
build” did not create an “intent to build” because “neither utility
has made a final decision as to whether or not it will actually
build these proposed new reactors.”162 The court dismissed this
Winter 2015

argument by giving a high degree of deference to the FPSC’s
interpretation of the statute.163
The court concluded that the statute did not require a final
decision on the actual construction. Based on § 366.93(6), which
allows a utility to recover prudently incurred costs even when
that utility elects not to complete the construction of the nuclear
facility, it was not the intent of the statute to require a final decision in order to recover prudently incurred pre-construction
costs.164 Even with the potential pitfalls of the “option to build”
approach, the court reasoned that the PSC’s interpretation indicated that an option to build could demonstrate an intent to build
and fulfill the requirements of the statute.165

Problem With the “Intent to Build” Interpretation
The court thoroughly discusses “intent to build” in SACE v.
Graham.166 The same language was relied on heavily by SACE in
their brief and oral argument.167 But the phrase “intent to build”
did not appear at all in Rule 25-60423, Florida Administrative
Code, nor in § 366.93, Florida Statutes, prior to the case. The
question of “intent to build” versus “option to build” originally
came from the FPSC order approving ACR for FPL and DEF.168
The court likely addressed this issue with the anticipation of setting precedent in this area. By following the FPSC interpretation
of the statute and recognizing an intent to build requirement, the
court essentially added that requirement to the law. The language
is not within the text of the statute, and to impute such language
may have been an overreach by the FPSC and the court. As
discussed in the next section, the Florida legislature amended §
366.93 and limited the use of “intent to build.”

Changes to § 366.93 after SACE v. Graham
After the decision in SACE v. Graham, the Florida legislature passed a bill that amended the cost recovery statute.169
The amended version of § 366.93 elaborated and clarified the
requirements for ACR, including the addition of “intent to build”
language. Four distinct phases of development and recovery
were defined by the statute: (1) licensing and certification; (2)
pre-construction phase; (3) construction phase; and (4) commercial in service phase. The amended version of the statute
retained an allowance for cost recovery in the event that a utility
did not complete construction.170
Prior to obtaining a COL from the NRC, a utility provider
may recover costs “related to, or necessary for” obtaining that
licensing and certification.171 After obtaining the COL, the cost
recovery statute and capacity cost recovery clause together allow
utility providers to recover site selection and pre-construction
costs.172 As defined in the rule, site selection and pre-construction costs:
include, but are not limited to: any and all costs
associated with preparing, reviewing and defending
a Combined Operating License (COL) application
for a nuclear power plant; costs associated with
site and technology selection; costs of engineering,
designing, and permitting the nuclear . . . power
plant; costs of clearing, grading, and excavation;
and costs of on-site construction facilities.173
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The utility must undergo an annual Nuclear Cost Recovery
Clause proceeding for approval of pre-construction costs. In this
review, the FPSC makes a determination of feasibility of the
plant and reasonability of the projected costs in order to approve
pre-construction costs.174 The standard of review is “reasonable”
and “feasible” and does not include an “intent to build” requirement.175 The Florida legislature chose not to adopt the “intent to
build” standard for normally incurred costs.
In addition to clarifying the phases of development for
which cost recovery may be used, the amended 2013 cost
recovery statute placed two time restrictions on recovery of preconstruction costs if the utility has not begun construction of the
plant.176 First, ten years after the date the utility receives a COL,
it must petition the FPSC for cost recovery. The FPSC then
must determine “whether the utility remains intent on building
the plant.”177 In this situation, the legislature
included the “intent to
build” language from
the decision in SACE v.
Graham. “Intent to build”
is further defined in the
statute by a showing
that “the utility proves
by a preponderance of
the evidence that it has
committed suff icient,
meaningful, and available
resources to enable the
project to be completed
and that its intent is realistic and practical.”178 This
section specifies that it is
for cost recovery “under
this paragraph,” meaning
under § 366.93(3)(f).179
After twenty years from
the receipt of the COL,
if construction has not
begun on the plant, the utility may not receive future costs relating to the plant.180
The FPSC has the power to review the project prior to construction in order to approve proceeding with the project.181 The
requirements for the approval of the recovery of construction
costs are feasibility of the project and reasonable projected costs,
the same requirements as pre-construction costs.182
Often, an administrative agency or judicial body will give
specific meaning to a statute or other legislation through interpretation. The legislature is given the responsibility to affirm or
deny this interpretation by amending the legislation. This process was followed in SACE v. Graham and in the order by the
FPSC. As discussed above, the FPSC order inserted the idea of
“intent to build” into § 366.93 and the Rule 25-6.0423 annual
reporting requirement.183 The Florida Supreme Court, giving a

high degree of deference to the FPSC’s interpretation, confirmed
the “intent to build” requirement.184
The Florida legislature, seemingly in reaction to SACE
v. Graham, enacted an amendment to §366.93 in 2013. This
amendment adopted the FPSC’s idea of an “intent to build”
requirement; however, it was only included in § 366.93(3)
(f), which is specific to a situation where the utility has not
begun construction of a plant within ten years of receiving the
COL.185 “Intent to build” is not a requirement for pre-construction or construction phase cost recovery under § 366.93(3)(c)
or (e). The 2013 amendment separated the requirements for
each phase, and specifically stated, that for the pre-construction
and construction phases, the requirements for cost recovery are
that the plant remains “feasible” and the projected costs are
“reasonable.”186 Essentially, the legislature accepted the “intent
to build” requirement
but narrowed it to certain situations where the
project is stalled in the
pre-construction phase.

“Even with the addition
of “intent to build” in the
statute, utility providers
have a very low level of
liability for canceling
a project, and therefore
advanced nuclear cost
recovery is not meeting
the legislative intent of
promoting investment in
nuclear electricity generation.”
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Florida Public
Service Commission
Rulemakings

Since the FPSC
is charged with issuing rules to uphold the
purpose of the cost
recovery statute, it was
required to address the
2013 amendment. 187
Based on the decision
in SACE v. Graham and
the 2013 amendment to
§ 366.93, the FPSC has
issued a proposed rule
to “implement changes
to Section 366.93, F.S.,
enacted by the 2013
Legislature.” 188 In this
proposed amendment to Rule 25-6.0423, the PSC added a
requirement of “intent to build” to the annual report and
application for cost recovery.189 This mirrors the language of
FPSC Order No. PSC-11-0547-FOF-EI and the language of
SACE v. Graham.190 This expands beyond § 366.93, however,
which requires only a showing of “intent to build” for a facility that has been in the pre-construction phase for more than
ten years.191 The FPSC’s proposed requirement is a showing of
intent to build for every year regardless of the amount of time
the utility has had a license.192

Florida Public Service Commission Levy
Facility Decision
Despite recent clarification of standards through court
decisions, legislation, and administrative rules, nuclear cost
recovery is not achieving its goals entirely, as evidenced by the
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

controversy over the Levy nuclear generating facility.193 The
FPSC confirmed that in the event the reactor construction is cancelled, a utility can still recover the planning and licensing costs
as stipulated in the statute.194 Even with the addition of “intent
to build” in the statute, utility providers have a very low level of
liability for canceling a project, and therefore advanced nuclear
cost recovery is not meeting the legislative intent of promoting
investment in nuclear electricity generation. The following section of this article proposes a change in the administration of
ACR or CWIP schemes that uses the rate of return to the utility
to meet the goal of investment in new nuclear generating plants.
Several legislators in Florida are attempting to repeal the
Florida cost recovery statute. In the 2014 session, House Bill
No. 4001 proposed to repeal the program entirely.195 The bill
died in the Energy and Utility Subcommittee. Given the controversy surrounding the Levy County facility abandonment,
future attempts to repeal the statute and dismantle ACR in
Florida are possible.
Advanced cost recovery has been thoroughly discussed and
analyzed in this article. The following section attempts to take
the lessons learned from this analysis and offers a suggestion
to improve the outcome
of and participation in
ACR programs.

Proposed Change
to Advanced Cost
Recovery
Regulation

“Where a utility took measures
to be more environmentally
compliant, they were rewarded
with an increase in the
allowable rate.”

State governments
across the country
have taken an affirmative step to incentivize
development of nuclear
electricity generation through ACR legislation. As discussed
above, there have been challenges and flaws found in ACR laws.
Fortunately, however, they can be improved. By adding incentive
to the rate of return on the rate base (“ROR”)196 or implementing
a tiered rate of return (“Tiered Rate”) utilities could be further
encouraged to continue nuclear development and utilize ACR.
This section will use the Florida ACR law as a guide, but the
suggestions could be applied to any ACR or CWIP scheme.
Cost recovery should be more purposeful in the encouragement of new nuclear development, especially in the early stages
of development and construction of a nuclear facility. Currently,
ACR costs are recovered at the approved AFUDC rate.197 This
applies to all costs in the pre-construction and construction
phases.198 In a typical FPSC ratemaking case, the ROR is calculated based on the utilities actual costs and an allowed rate
or return. The FPSC looks at tolerance for risk associated with
other utilities and the specific utility making the application.
It then considers other investments with similar risk and bases
the rate of return accordingly. In this process, the FPSC considers the utility as a whole, with the entire mix of generating
sources.199 No one plant is given a rate of return. This process
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could be amended for pre-construction and construction costs
under ACR.
In the ratemaking case, costs associated with ACR are
isolated and analyzed separately from other costs. As seen in
SACE v. Graham, CWIP costs are securitized as “prudent” and
cannot be included in the rate base unless the utility makes an
affirmative showing that the project is feasible and the costs
are reasonably incurred.200 A similar analysis of costs occurs in
other states. Once costs approved under ACR are included in the
rate base, the utility still itemizes the costs on each customer’s
individual utility bill. Typically, the portion of the bill associated
with ACR is a separate line item, like fees and taxes. Since the
FPSC already separates these costs for purposes of ratemaking,
it would be possible to do likewise with the allowable ROR on
these costs.
Regulators have used ROR incentives in the past to encourage behavior by utility companies. One example of this type of
incentive is a rate increase for environmental compliance. Where
a utility took measures to be more environmentally compliant,
they were rewarded with an increase in the allowable rate. This
same process could work to encourage participation in ACR.
When a utility embarks
on the process of developing new nuclear power,
the associated costs could
be given a higher ROR.
Under this proposed
program, lawmakers
run the risk that increasing the ROR would
have a disincentive
effect, referred to as the
Averch-Johnson effect,
essentially encouraging
utilities to increase their costs in order to gain a higher return.
Alternatively, utilities may simply be careless with costs where
a higher return is possible. The prudency review can prevent this
outcome. PSCs can deny the recovery of costs where wasteful
or irresponsible spending occurs. Lawmakers and regulators
can facilitate a balance by increasing the incentive to use ACR
to gain a higher ROR on associated costs, but simultaneously
controlling costs through a prudency review.
A tiered rate, with separated ROR for costs incurred in each
stage of the project, could also serve to further the purposes of
the ACR statute. Cost recovery would be more effective if incentives were higher in the construction phase and lower in situations where, for example, the project is delayed or postponed,
which happened with the DEF Levy facility.201
Under current legislation, a utility would recover all costs
at a set AFUDC rate. ACR merely allows the utility to recover
costs earlier than otherwise possible. But under a tiered rate
scheme, the profit margins for the pre-construction phase would
be greater than the AFUDC. This would incentivize the utility
to pursue nuclear power projects. Costs associated with the construction phase, which historically have been the biggest hurdle
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for development, would have an even higher profit margin. Once
the facility is online, the profit margin would be readjusted to a
typical ROR. In a case of recovering costs for a facility that is
not completed, or canceled, like the Levy project, the set recovery rate could be below the AFUDC to discourage cancellation
of a project. To balance the risks, utility providers could recover
the costs involved, but with lower profit.
There are some potential downsides to this plan. For
instance, the increased incentive in the pre-construction phase
could cause the utility to cancel the project early and recover
the costs at the higher margin. Or, the utility could bundle its
costs in the construction phase in order to recover a higher
profit margin on more costs. One solution to this problem is
accountability through regular reporting, based on a more
stringent “reasonable and feasible” standard. Public Service
Commissions should move away from the “intent to build”
standard while making more stringent decisions on what is
reasonable and feasible. Either the proposed tiered rate ACR or
the simpler incentive rate would be a step toward achieving the
goal of improved ACR laws.

Conclusion
Nuclear power has emerged from a dark age of unpopularity and neglect and is experiencing a renaissance. Indeed,
given nuclear energy’s dramatic environmental and reliability
advantages over other sources of electricity, it is surprising the
resurgence has not been greater. But costs and financial risk
still present daunting obstacles. The federal government has
shown support for nuclear through loan guarantees, tax incentives, and risk mitigation, while several states have attempted
to encourage nuclear power through ACR legislation. The
Vogtle, V.C. Summer, and Turkey Point projects are directly
attributable to ACR.
The analysis of SACE v. Graham and the three state statutes
revealed strengths of ACR and weaknesses that can be improved.
Adjusting the rate of return is only one possibility. Nuclear power
can help achieve a stronger energy future; ACR is a vehicle to
make that happen.
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